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Abstract 
In many diagnosis and repair domains, diagnostic reasoning cannot be abstracted from repair 
actions, nor from actions necessary to obtain information of diagnostic value. TraumAID 2.0, 
a consultation system for multiple trauma management, implements a reasoning architecture for 
exploratory-corrective domains which integrates diagnostic reasoning with planning and action. 
Taking the view that a diagnosis is only worthwhile to the extent hat it can affect repair decisions, 
its goal-directed diagnosis (GDD) framework views the diagnosis object as secondary to the 
formation of appropriate goals for a complementary planner. 
We start this article with a specific case of multiple trauma injury. Demonstrating some of 
the key features of exploratory-corrective domains, we use this case to exemplify the suitability 
of our approach. Before focusing on the GDD reasoner itself, we overview TraumAID 2.0’s 
exploratory-corrective management architecture in which it is embedded with a companion planner, 
and explain its iterative interaction with the physician. The paper’s main body presents GDD’s 
formalism, and knowledge representation scheme, and proposes a design methodology for GDD- 
based systems (the companion planner, and the implemented system are described elsewhere). 
Before concluding, we present a set of strategies characteristic of exploratory-corrective domains, 
and argue the suitability of our framework for their implementation. 
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1. Background and motivation 
In many domains, it is common to distinguish reasoning and activity concerned with 
what problems need to be addressed from that reasoning concerned with how to address 
those problems. Consequently, artificial intelligence (AI) subsumes as separate subdisci- 
plines diagnosis research, seeking the source (or sources) of a system’s faulty behavior, 
and planning research, concerned with the construction of action plans to achieve cer- 
tain goals. Based on this dichotomy, most diagnostic programs take a diagnosis-the 
conjectured set of problems-as their objective. 
In some domains, however, this separation may be limiting. In trauma management, 
for one, therupy is the ultimate objective and diagnosis is merely something that may 
have to be done in order to achieve that objective. We argue that, in exploratory- 
corrective domains such as trauma management, diagnosis should only be pursued so 
long as it can affect those decisions for which it is carried out in the first place, 
namely repair decisions. We will refer to this principle as the goal-directed diagnosis 
principle. Furthermore, we believe that where activity is necessary for both diagnostic 
and therapeutic purposes, particularly where it is necessary to interleave the two, it may 
be advantageous to integrate diagnostic reasoning and planning capabilities. 
Multiple trauma management is an excellent exemplar of an exploratory-corrective 
domain. Consider the following (fictitious) case: 
JR, a male in his early forties, was brought to the Emergency Room in an unstable 
condition (shock’ ) after being shot twice in the chest. He had decreased breath 
sounds on both sides, and his neck veins were distended. JR also suffered from a 
broken arm, apparently twisted when he fell to the pavement in front of his office 
building. 
The above text shows ( 1) that when a patient arrives in an Emergency Room (ER) , 
the information available is often incomplete and cannot support any deep diagnosis- 
thus the need for exploration; and (2) that trauma management often involves multiple 
injuries-hence the need for intricate planning to resolve possible conflicts between 
competing diagnostic and/or therapeutic needs. 
Initial assessment showed muffled heart sounds, but normal pulses and normal 
abdominal findings. The attending physician hypothesized that the shock resulted 
from a tension pneumothorax 2 in one or both sides of the chest and/or from a 
pericardiac injury. 3 Secondary concerns were that a bullet may have injured organs 
internal to the chest and/or abdomen. 
This part of JR’s management exemplifies a routine physical examination, as opposed 
to a more elaborate planning of costly and risky procedures. Also note that a set of 
’ By shock we generally refer to low blood pressure. 
’ A pneumothorax is a condition in which air leaks into the chest cavity between the chest wall and the lung 
to the point beyond which the return of blood to the heart is affected by the resulting increase in pressure. 
’ A pericardial famponade is a condition in which blood accumulates in the pericardial sac, interfering with 
the heart’s function. 
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potential diagnoses is identified-a common diagnostic practice, often referred to as 
hypothesis generation. 
The most urgent need at this point was clearly the restabilization of JR. Since a 
tension pneumothorax was determined to be the most likely cause of shock, a needle 
aspiration of both sides of the chest was urgently called for. (If that hypothesis were 
confirmed, a chest tube would be inserted to further ease the pneumothorax.) A 
needle aspiration of the pericardial sac was contingently planned, in case the shock 
was not relieved. Finally, X-ray studies of the chest and abdomen were planned to 
rule out other injuries. The arm injury was ignored at this point. 
Several additional features of the multiple trauma management domain are illustrated 
by the above segment: 
First, that active exploration is often necessary. It is important to note that diagnostic 
activity may affect the patient’s state in addition to one’s knowledge about it. In some 
cases, diagnostic activity may have an adverse effect, either directly or due to the time 
and resources it consumes. In other cases, a diagnostic action may also have a certain 
therapeutic effect; a needle aspiration of the chest, for instance, may partially relieve an 
existing tension pneumothorax. 
Second, with respect to the choice of diagnostic means, hypotheses may sometimes 
be testable in several alternative ways. For example, a tension pneumothorax can also 
be detected on an X-ray film. Conversely, a single test can often provide information 
on more than one condition. For example, a single X-ray will often shed light on 
several hypotheses. Thus, in selecting a test, there may be an efficiency to be gained by 
selecting tests that cover a few of the hypothesized conditions. Other important factors 
in test selection are accuracy, expediency, the risk and pain involved, dollar cost, etc. 
For example, in JR’s case, an invasive needle aspiration procedure was chosen over a 
non-invasive, but not as expedient, X-ray study. 
Third, considering further interactions of competing needs, some injuries are more 
urgent and/or more important than others. We have just seen that urgency can af- 
fect the choice of means (preferring more expedient procedures). Urgency and im- 
portance, however, can also affect the order in which various needs are pursued. In 
the multiple trauma management domain, it is common to categorize problems as be- 
ing related to either airway, or breathing, or circulation, etc. (the so-called ABC’s of 
trauma management), and to attend to them in that order of importance. These prin- 
ciples lead on one hand to the immediate pursuit of the pneumothorax (urgent as a 
potential cause of shock and important by virtue of being an airway-related problem), 
and on the other hand to the neglect of the broken arm. Also notice that diagnos- 
tic tests aimed at competing hypotheses, e.g. pneumothorax and pericardial tampon- 
ade as alternative causes of shock, are sometimes ordered by their assessed likeli- 
hood. 
Continuing with JR’s management: 
The needle aspiration of the chest came up negative for the right, but positive for 
the left chest. Nevertheless, despite the chest decompression, JR remained in a state 
of shock. The diagnostic efforts were thus shifted to a pericardial tamponade as 
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an alternative cause of shock. In the meanwhile, a chest tube was inserted into the 
left chest to prevent deterioration of the pneumothorax condition. In addition to 
aspirating the pericardial sac, the current management plan also called for active 
monitoring of the chest tube (visually and via an X-ray, to see that it was correctly 
placed and functioning) and of the pneumothorax condition, as well as for the 
remaining X-ray studies. 
The needle aspiration of the pericardial sac proved to be effective in restabilizing 
JR, implicating pericardial tamponade as the true cause of shock. JR’s chest was 
now continuously decompressed, to allow further diagnosis until a heart surgery 
can be performed. 
In the above segment, we see a shift of attention from a positive pneumothorax to 
a potential pericardial tamponade. It is an excellent example of a diagnostic action 
(aspiration of the chest) that “succeeded” but yet does not address completely the pur- 
pose for which it was taken. This part of the management also demonstrates occasional 
need to intersperse diagnosis and treatment. Intentionally incomplete treatment is also 
demonstrated by the temporary decompression of the pericardial sac. The definitive heart 
surgery is postponed to allow further diagnosis and treatment of other injuries. This de- 
lay is also motivated by other planning principles: first, logistically, such operation can 
only be done in the operating room; and second, as will soon be demonstrated, future 
diagnoses may require operations that could be more efficiently combined with this 
surgery. 
While the chest tube achieved its objective of relieving the pneumothorax, the 
massive flow of blood from the chest indicated a massive hemothorux4 A left 
thoracotomy 5 was then planned to treat this condition. However, given the con- 
current need for a heart surgery, both operations were slightly altered to include a 
single incision across the chest such that both the heart and the left chest cavity 
are exposed. 
We have seen before a diagnostic action with therapeutic effects. What we see here 
is an example of empirical therupy, i.e. the use of treatment as a diagnostic device 
by observing the patient’s response. The chest tube, which was inserted for mainly 
therapeutic reasons, provided important diagnostic information. We also see efficiency 
gained by combining treatment for two problems. 
A chest X-ray, performed next, showed a hemothorax condition developing in the 
right chest, although not as massive as the one on the left. It further showed one 
bullet, in the chest midline. The other bullet did not appear on that film. Two more 
X-rays were then taken: a lateral chest X-ray to establish the exact location of the 
first bullet near the spine;6 and an abdominal X-ray to determine if the second 
bullet lodged in the abdominal cavity. At this point, the current management plan 
’ A hemothorax is internal bleeding in the chest cavity which results in blood accumulation between the 
lungs and the chest, in turn collapsing the lung. 
5 A thoracotomy is a chest operation. 
6 The 3D location can only be determined via the combination of both X-rays. 
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called subsequently for a urinalysis, and then for a chest surgery and a laparotomy’ 
to repair the diaphragm and to explore other possible injuries in the abdomen. 
An important principle demonstrated here is that of limited diagnosis. From the infor- 
mation available so far, the entry wounds and the bullet locations cannot be correlated 
with certainty. Specifically, we are uncertain as to which of the two bullets has made 
its way to the heart and which headed down to the abdomen. As a result, we can- 
not determine which of the organs internal to the abdomen were injured; in particular, 
whether the left or right part of the diaphragm needs to be repaired. However, since 
such determination would not have affected the management plan (it would not change 
the type of surgery procedure chosen-a laparotomy), it is not pursued further. 
A related phenomenon, that of parsimonious repair, is also demonstrated here. A 
chest tube, normally inserted to treat a hemothorax, is excluded given that the patient is 
anyway headed for a surgery that will expose the right chest cavity. 
The urinalysis test came back negative, and JR finally underwent a bilateral trans- 
verse sternotomy and a laparotomy. He was then transferred to the Intensive Care 
Unit for monitoring. 
To summarize, this case is characteristic of exploratory-corrective domains in the 
kind of issues involved in reasoning and acting. It starts with incomplete information 
and ill-specified corrective goals. To decide which goals to pursue, and how to pursue 
them, an intelligent agent will typically have to start off with some exploration. After 
reaching a certain level of knowledge, such an agent will begin pursuing repair goals, 
while continuing exploration as necessary. What is probably the hallmark of intelligent 
exploratory-corrective behavior is that decisions as to whether to pursue a diagnostic 
test or a repair procedure, when to pursue it, to what extent, and using what means, are 
ultimately based on the potential effect on repair objectives. 
Our research goal was the development of a reasoning framework and of a system de- 
sign methodology that address the special needs of exploratory-corrective domains, and 
the development of TraumAID 2.0-a particular system for the multiple trauma manage- 
ment domain. TraumAID 2.0’s exploratory-corrective management (ECM) architecture 
separates a diagnostic reasoner, concerned with characterization and goal setting, and a 
planner, concerned with construction of action plans. This paper presents goal-directed 
diagnosis (GDD), a diagnostic reasoning framework which emphasizes diagnostic and 
therapeutic goals as the important aspect of solving diagnostic problems. The companion 
planner, and other aspects of TraumAID 2.0 are discussed elsewhere [ 48,501. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contrasts our view of the goals of 
diagnosis with that of related formulations. To situate GDD’s reasoning style, Section 3 
overviews TraumAID 2.0 and its ECM architecture. Then, in the paper’s main body, 
Sections 4 and 5 present the GDD formalism and mechanisms. Section 6 suggests a 
design methodology for GDD-based exploratory-corrective systems. Finally, Section 7 
presents a catalogue of strategies typical to exploratory-corrective domains, and shows 
that these can be naturally encoded using the proposed framework. 
7 A laparotomy is abdominal surgery. 
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2. Related formulations of the diagnostic task 
In this section, we first characterize the GDD framework in terms of a few commonly 
used dimensions. Then, we contrast our view of diagnosis and repair in exploratory- 
corrective domains, as embodied in GDD, with that taken by other researchers, 
Diagnostic reasoning has been an important area of artificial intelligence, and has 
resulted in quite a few methodologies and techniques. This large body of research is 
typically categorized along the following dimensions: 
l the number of faults subject to diagnosis; 
l the number of alternative explanations sought; in particular, whether a single ex- 
planation (e.g. most plausible, or most probable) is sought, or is it the case that 
all possible hypotheses that explain, or even are just consistent with the observed 
behavior, are of interest; 
l what is modeled: whether an explicit (“deep”) model of the diagnosed system is 
used (model-based diagnosis [ 1 l] ), or is it a model, or imitation of the behavior 
of, a human diagnostician; 
l lzow it is modeled: whether formal methods are used (e.g. based on logic and/or 
probability), or is it a model in which proven domain-specific heuristics are en- 
coded; 
l whether or not new observations are actively sought: some paradigms are concur- 
rent, that is they try to work from a given set of observations, whereas others are 
sequential and so guide the user in acquiring necessary information; 
l the assumptions made about the state of the system and/or the fault: some assume 
a static system, whereas others model change over time, or at least allow for such 
change; some assume the fault is static whereas others allow for non-monotonic or 
intermittent faults. 
In terms of these attributes, the GDD framework is aimed at multiple fault situations. 
It is a discrete, logic-based formalization of an expert’s reasoning. GDD is clearly a 
concurrent framework since it only seeks one explanation. However, it is iteratively 
invoked in each cycle of the ECM architecture, to create an active sequential diagnosis 
and repair framework. Finally, GDD allows for non-monotonicity, but lacks explicit 
reasoning about change. 
GDD differs from other formulations of diagnosis in its view of the goals of the 
diagnostic process. Consider the following definitions of the term “diagnosis”, taken 
from various dictionaries: 
Diagnosis (Oxford Dictionary). Determining the nature of (esp. a disease) from 
observations of symptoms. 
Diagnosis (Webster Dictionary). 1: The art or act of identifying a disease from 
its signs and symptoms. 2: investigation or analysis of the cause or nature of a 
condition, situation, or problem (diagnosis of engine trouble). 
Diagnosis (Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary). 1: The art of distinguishing 
one disease from another. 2: The determination of the nature of a case, or a 
disease. 
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In light of these definitions of the term diagnosis, it is common for AI diagnostic 
frameworks to take a diagnosis object to be a characterization of a state of affairs, e.g. 
the particular fault in a device, and to take the diagnostic task to be the determination 
of such a characterization. In formalizing GDD, we take the different view that the 
recommendations that result from a diagnosis are important. Thus, characterization of 
the appropriate goals, and not merely of what is true at a given moment, is the objective 
of a GDD reasoner. 
Poole and Provan [42] observe that the optimality of a diagnosis must depend on 
post-diagnosis goals. In [ 451, they advocate the use of utilities; in [ 431, they note that 
there is often no need for a complete explanation and that the granularity of a solution 
depends on its uses, and also on available tests. Leake, in his work on explanation 
evaluation [33], shares a similar view albeit in a different domain: “An explainer’s 
reasons for explaining have profound effects on the information that a good explana- 
tion must provide”. He presents a taxonomy of explanation purposes and shows how 
each one results in a different explanation of the same event. While the GDD principle 
can be viewed as a utility maximization principle, our formalization of GDD does not 
use probabilities, nor outcome preferences. Instead, we use a logical framework which 
allows some representation of uncertainty. Utility maximizing behavior is achieved by 
explicitly representing and reasoning about goals. In this paradigm, actions can be 
ruled in or out depending on interactions among competing goals and among alter- 
native actions for addressing these goals, e.g. suppression, subsumption, compatibility, 
preferences, etc. 
As illustrated by JR’s case, diagnosis and repair are often inseparable in exploratory- 
corrective domains. GDD is therefore proposed as part of a total approach for diag- 
nostic and therapeutic reasoning and activity-the ECM architecture-which combines 
diagnostic reasoning and planning. Recent work by Friedrich et al. [ 19,201, and by 
Sun and Weld [ 521, shares much of this view. Friedrich et al.‘s theory, for exam- 
ple, has no explicit notion of a diagnosis object. Instead, a sequence of tests and 
repair actions is sought that if applied to the current state will imply (as in a logical 
proof) a restoration of the diagnosed system to a proper working condition. Presented 
not as a theory of diagnosis but as a theory of repair planning, their work applies 
Winslett’s possible models planning approach [55] to a diagnostic domain. Sun and 
Weld use UWL, a srtups-like language, in an approach which integrates GDE-Style 
diagnosis [ 141 and srIuPs-style planning [ 171. The link between diagnosis and repair 
planning in real applications is also emphasized by Pepper and Kahn [401. Also re- 
lated, although to a lesser extent, is work by Rushby and Crow [47] who formalize 
reconfiguration, a form of repair, using an extension of Reiter’s theory of diagno- 
sis [ 13,461. In GDD, diagnostic and therapeutic goals are treated as equals. Goals, 
of whichever type, are used to focus on repair worthy issues. In the ECM archi- 
tecture, direct interactions between goals of all types are resolved using GDD rules 
(goal level resolution) ; all indirect interactions are resolved by the accompanying plan- 
ner. 
Finally, we noted that in exploratory-corrective domains, an agent may have to acf 
in order to obtain diagnostic information. An important observation from the multi- 
ple trauma management domain is that such diagnostic activity may affect the actual 
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state of the patient and not only our knowledge about it. As evident in JR’s case, in 
some instances the very condition a given diagnostic action attempts to diagnose may 
be affected by this action. In most sequential diagnosis frameworks, the decision to 
act is based on the potential, or expected, discriminatory power of a given piece of 
information, with little or no consideration to the potential ramifications of the diag- 
nostic activity. Some sequential frameworks use a cost measure to model the effect 
of actions. However, as noted by Genesereth [ 211, this approach is too simplistic. In 
our work, rather than worrying about more accurate models of action, we claim that 
diagnostic research can simply rely on properly integrating planning research. Goals, 
diagnostic and therapeutic, are a natural interface between a diagnostic reasoner and 
a planner, and are therefore singled out as the “architectural duty” of a GDD rea- 
soner. 
3. TraumAID 2.0: an overview 
The TraumAID project is a joint effort between the Computer and Information Sci- 
ence Department at the University of Pennsylvania and the Medical College of Penn- 
sylvania, aimed at providing computerized decision support during the initial definitive 
management of trauma patients (see [ 541 for an overview). TraumAID 1.0, the first 
generation of this program (developed between 1984 and 1988), was a strictly rule- 
based program. In an empirical study, in its limited domain, TraumAID 1.0 was found 
to outperform surgical residents, albeit not experienced surgeons [ 5,6,8]. One of the 
main weaknesses of TraumAID 1.0 was its lack of adequate treatment of actions. Re- 
quests for actions were generated as a byproduct of a backward chaining on rules for 
suspected injuries. The significant interaction of actions addressing different injuries, 
cf. JR’s case, has made it hard to extend TraumAID 1.0 to more body parts, and to 
address more complex injury patterns. In TraumAID 2.0, we aimed to remedy this 
weakness by adding a planning capability, and by adopting a GDD framework for the 
program’s diagnostic reasoning component. Modularizing the “what” (what is known to 
be wrong, and what has to be investigated? what therapeutic goals should be attained, 
and what such goals have been achieved?) from the “how” and “when” (which of 
multiple alternative means to use, and in what order?), enhances the scalability of the 
program. 
TraumAID 2.0 uses an exploratory-corrective management (ECM) architecture in 
which a basic cycle of diagnostic reasoning, planning and action is repeated (Fig. 1) . 
This architecture satisfies the following desiderata, deemed important for exploratory- 
corrective domains: 
(1) It allows interleaving diagnosis and repair. 
(2) It positions the diagnostic reasoner to 
(a) set diagnostic and therapeutic goals; 
(b) use incoming evidence to monitor actions and/or other events; 
(c) reason about changes in knowledge or state to adapt current goals. 
(3) It positions the planner to mediate between concurrent diagnostic and therapeutic 
needs. 
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Fig. 1. The ECM architecture: vidence is processed to characterize the current state of affairs, and to set 
diagnostic and therapeutic goals; an overall action plan is constructed to address all goals; actions taken by 
the physician provide new evidence to start a new cycle in which earlier conclusions and plans are revised. 
Each consultation session in TraumAID 2.0 consists of several such cycles. In this paper, 
we focus on a formalization of TraumAID 2.0’s GDD-based reasoning component. For 
description of other parts of the system, the interested reader is referred to [48,50,54]. 
TraumAID 2.0 was originally implemented in Common-Lisp on a Symbolics platform, 
and was recently ported by Jonathan Kaye to a Sun-based X-windows environment as 
well as to a Macintosh platform. The new system currently consists of some 685 rules, 
out of which 184 are goal-setting rules (cf. Section 5). Its planner can address 128 
different goals, with a vocabulary of 95 different procedures (small plans), and 104 
different actions (cf. [ 501). On the Sun platform, each cycle of diagnostic reasoning 
and planning takes an average of about a second or two. 
Fig. 2 shows a glimpse at TraumAID 2.0’s screen immediately after a consultation 
session for JR’s case. The two Given windows, at the top right, detail all information 
provided by the physician, voluntarily, or in response to TraumAID 2.0’s plans. The 
Conclusions window, at the middle left, displays all conclusions made so far. During the 
run of the program, the Projected Goals window, just below Conclusions, presents all 
goals that were identified and that still need be addressed, whereas the Goals Pursued 
window, to the right of it, presents goals that have already been addressed. Another 
window, presenting the current management plan, is missing from the picture (at this 
point there is no plan). Finally, the Procedures Performed, at the bottom right, logs all 
procedures in the order that they have been reported done. 
TraumAID 2.0’s management plans have been retrospectively compared to those gen- 
erated by its predecessor, TraumAID 1.0, and to the actual care on 97 real trauma cases. 
Three independent trauma ‘surgeons have judged TraumAID 2.0’s plans preferable to 
TraumAID 1.0’s plans by a ratio of 62:9 with 26 ties (p < 0.001 by binomial test), and 
to the actual care by a ratio of 64:17 with 16 ties (p < 0.001). In at least two cases, it 
is believed that a patient’s death could have been prevented had TraumAID 2.0’s man- 
agement been followed. In the only three cases where TraumAID 2.0’s management was 
judged unacceptable by the judges, our domain expert (an experienced trauma surgeon 
himself) believes they were wrong, and/or there are disagreements between the judges 
themselves. The reader is referred to [7,48] for a more in-depth description of this 
study, and a more detailed analysis of its results, including a critical evaluation of all 
cases in which TraumAID 2.0’s management was judged significantly weaker than the 
actual care. 
e
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4. A formalism for representing uncertainty about what we know and about what 
we want to know or achieve 
In this section, we introduce a novel representation scheme which separates one’s 
belief in whether a certain condition holds, from one’s desire to acquire knowledge 
about whether it holds, and/or to achieve a state in which it is believed to hold. A 
standard belief component is used to represent the former, whereas an additional attitude 
component captures the latter. To allow for uncertainty, and in particular to allow for 
various types of “unknowns”, we adopt a multi-valued logical framework. 
4.1. Multi-valued logics 
Ginsberg’s multi-valued logics (MVL) is a formal framework for inference in which 
each proposition is assigned not only a truth value, corresponding to the strength of 
belief in that proposition being true orfulse, but also a knowledge assessment, measuring 
roughly the amount of knowledge used in deriving this belief [ 241. Bilattices in which 
one partial order corresponds to the truthfulness measure and the other to the knowledge 
assessment are used in MVL as domains. 
The first formalization of GDD [49] used a three-valued logic in which each propo- 
sition was assigned a true, false, or unknown belief. Here, we present an MVL-based 
reformulation of GDD, the immediate result which is the ability to consistently extend 
the inference paradigm to more expressive domains. In Section 5.3, we show this to be 
useful in explicitly representing and reasoning about contradictory information. In [ 481, 
we outline an extension which facilitates reasoning with defaults. 
In this new formalization of GDD, each proposition is assigned a value drawn from the 
cross-product of rwo bilattices: one representing belief, the other representing attitude. 
The notion of belief is interpreted regularly, representing one’s belief in whether a 
certain propositional statement is true or not. The attitude component is used to represent 
problem-solving control information and measures the relevance of acquiring information 
about, or achieving the condition described by the particular proposition. The belief 
bilattice still has the truthfulness and knowledge partial orders whereas the attitude 
bilattice has relevance and knowledge dimensions. 
Within Ginsberg’s paradigm, domain knowledge is expressed using general first-order 
formulae, and thus requires an underlying theorem prover. In contrast, TraumAID 1.0 
used a rule-based representation. In formalizing TraumAID 2.0, rather than adopting 
Ginsberg’s formulation in full, and then having to completely reconstruct the domain 
knowledge, we have specialized MVL to the rule-based case. Besides fitting our needs, 
we believe that the specialized theory may be useful for others wishing to convert other 
rule-based systems to MVL. While the material presented next is self-contained, the 
reader is referred to [24] for a more complete coverage of MVL. 
4.2. Attitude and belief 
As mentioned, throughout the whole diagnosis and repair process, the GDD reasoner 
maintains and updates an attitude and a belief for a set of propositional statements. TO 
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Truthfulness 
Fig. 3. A four-point truth-knowledge bilattice. 
remain general, propositions are taken to be any fact about the patient or the world that 
the reasoner may know to hold, may know not to hold, may assume, may want to know 
whether holds, may want to achieve, may be confused about, etc. The problem solver’s 
belief in whether a proposition holds is separated from its attitude towards acquiring 
such knowledge, e.g., the perceived relevance of determining whether or not a patient 
suffers from a pericardial tamponade is separated from the belief about the patient’s 
condition. The problem solver’s attitude towards and/or belief in a given proposition 
changes over time due to new information becoming available, new inferences being 
drawn, activity being carried out, etc. 
Definition 4.1 (Lattice). A lattice is a triple (L, A, V), where L is its domain, A 
(“meet”) and V (“join”) are binary operations from L onto itself that are 
( 1) idempotent, i.e. a A a = a, a V a = a; 
(2) commutative, i.e. a A b = b A a, a V b = b V a; 
(3) associative,i.e. (aAb)Ac=a~(bAc),(aVb)Vc=uV(bVc);and 
(4) obey the absorption laws, i.e. a A (a V 6) = a, a V (a A b) = a. 
Alternatively, a lattice can be defined as a partially ordered set, any two elements 
of which have a greatest lower bound (glb) and a least upper bound (lub). The two 
definitions coincide by taking lub(u, b) = a V b, and glb(u, b) = a A b. A lattice is said 
to be complete if lub and glb can be defined for any subset of the lattice’s elements. 
Thus, any lattice with a finite domain is complete. 
Definition 4.2 (Bilattice). A bilattice is a sextuple (B, A, V, ., f, -) such that: 
(I) LI dzf (B,A,V) and L2 %f (B, ., +) are both complete lattices; and 
(2) 7: B ---f B is a mapping such that: 
(a) l2 = 1; and 
(b) 1 is a lattice homomorphism from LI to its dual & “zf (B,V,A) and from 
L2 to itself. 
Ginsberg discusses bilattices that are based on two partial orders: truth-wise (&), and 
knowledge-wise ( <k) . That is, each proposition is described by how strongly we believe 
it is true, and by how much knowledge was involved in inferring this belief. The smallest 
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I 0 R 
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Truthfulness 
Fig. 4. Four-point belief and attitude bilattices. 
Relevance 
nontrivial bilattice (Fig. 3) has four points: T (absolute truth), F (absolute false), U 
(unknown), and I (contradictory). In that bilattice, the Gt partial order defines one 
lattice (B, A, V), whereas the <k defines another lattice (B, ., +). Other bilattices may 
contain more, or even an infinite number of points. In any truth-knowledge bilattice, 
negation reverses the truth capacity of a proposition, leaving its knowledge capacity 
unchanged. In particular, within the four-point bilattice, 7 maps T to F and vice versa, 
leaving U and J- untouched. 
Two, possibly distinct, 8 bilattices are used in GDD as domains for attitude and belief 
respectively: 
Definition 4.3 (Attitude and belief). Given a set of primitive propositions H - def {hi}:=, 9 
l an attitude function maps H to an attitude bilattice BA; 
l a belief function maps H to a belief bilattice BB; 
l an attitude-belief function combines the two and maps H to the cross-product 
BA x BB. Alternatively, it can also be viewed as a pair (+A, 4~) of attitude and 
belief functions. 
For most of this paper, we will presume both BA and BB to be four-point bilattices 
such as those in Fig. 4. The belief bilattice, following Ginsberg’s suggestion, is defined 
by the truth-knowledge partial orders. In the attitude bilattice, a proposition is described 
by its relevance ( &) and the knowledge used to derive this relevance (<k). Note that 
one’s knowledge with respect to the truthfulness of a proposition need not equal one’s 
knowledge with respect to the relevance of that same proposition. The extreme points in 
the belief bilattice are labeled T and F, whereas same points are labeled R (for relevant) 
and I (for irrelevant) in the attitude bilattice. Extensions to more complex bilattices, in 
which defaults can be represented are discussed in [ 24,481. 
4.3. Interpreting an attitude-belief assignment 
Throughout all stages of a given diagnosis and repair session, an attitude-belief value 
is assigned to all propositions known to the system. This attitude-belief assignment is 
8 Given the features of a certain domain, it may conceivably be useful to choose an attitude bilattice that is 
more or less expressive than the belief bilattice. 
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updated whenever, and in accordance with (i.e. refecting inference), any new informa- 
tion which becomes available. 
Semantically, belief assignment to a given proposition is interpreted as an assessment 
of whether or not we believe the statement denoted by this proposition holds or not. 
For example, if +a (Hemothorax)= T, then we believe that the patient suffers from a 
hemothorax. Similarly, if 4~ (HemothoraxisRelieved)= T, then we believe that the 
hemothorax has in fact been relieved. 
The notion of “goal” is derived from the attitude assignment to a given proposition. 
Generally speaking, a proposition p is a goal if its attitude assignment is high on the 
relevance partial order (in our four-point bilattice if 4~ (p) = R). Note that there is no 
syntactic distinction between a diagnostic (knowledge seeking) and a therapeutic (state 
achieving) goal. For example, the relevance of knowing whether or not a patient suffers 
from a hemothorax is indicated via the attitude assignment $~~(Hemothorax) = R, and 
similarly the relevance of achieving u state in which the hemothorax is achieved is 
indicated via the attitude assignment $JA (HemothoraxisRelieved) = R. 
Of course, not every relevant proposition becomes automatically an operational goal. 
For example, if &(Hemothorax) = T then it is already believed that the patient does 
suffer from a hemothorax and thus, as a knowledge goal, it is already satisfied. An 
important distinction between a diagnostic and a therapeutic goal is that while the 
former is often regarded satisfied whenever any concrete belief can be assigned to the 
given proposition, the latter is only achieved when a positive determination is made. For 
example, the Hemothorax goal is satisfied when it is assigned a belief value of either T 
or F, whereas the HemothoraxisRelieved goal is only satisfied when it is assigned 
a belief value T. 
In general, in more complex bilattices, one has to define which combinations of 
relevance and achievement levels need be addressed, in what order of preference, etc. 
However, since its inference is purely syntactic, the GDD reasoner is indifferent to these 
semantic subtleties. Within the ECM architecture, it is the planner’s role to decide which 
goals to pursue. 
5. Knowledge representation and inference 
In this section, we introduce and illustrate two types of rules used in GDD to represent 
knowledge: 
l evidential rules represent conditions under which a certain belief should be adopted, 
and; 
l goal-setting rules represent conditions under which specific diagnostic and/or ther- 
apeutic goals should be pursued. 
We start with a simple representation scheme for diagnostic problems, and a corre- 
sponding inference procedure. Then, we extend both to allow for explicit representation 
of contradictory information. Finally, we explain what we take to be a solution to 
a diagnostic problem, and the role it plays in the operation of our ECM-based sys- 
tem. 
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5.1. Rules 
In GDD, we use rules to represent knowledge. Two types of rules are used: one for 
inferring belief, the other for inferring attitude. Antecedents in both types of rules are 
stated in belief terms, and are interpreted conjunctively. A rule’s consequent can be either 
a proposition p or its negation yp. An inference procedure specifies the way in which 
a rule’s antecedents are combined to infer a belief, or an attitude, for its consequent. 
Definition 5.1 (Antecedent). An antecedent is recursively defined as either: 
( 1) a proposition h; 
(2) rekvant( h), where h is a proposition; 
(3) ya, where a is an antecedent; 
(4) true(a), false( a), unknown(a), or contradictory(a), where a is an antecedent; or 
(5) known(a), unZess( a), or compatible-with(a), where a is an antecedent. 
Definition 5.2 (Rules). A rule R has two parts: a body, or a premise, which is a set 
of antecedents, and a consequent which is a single proposition. Let Anti denote an 
antecedent, and let d denote a consequent. GDD has two types of rules: 
(1) 
(2) 
Evidential rules are used to define and compute belief. They map evidence and 
lower-level conclusions to conclusions and take the form: 
Ant, AAnt A.., AAnt, + d. 
For example, the following evidential rule concludes an ischemic spinal cord 
injury: 
Loss_of _motor_in-legs A Thoracicaorticinjury 
A -Compoundfracture_vertebra 
=+ Ischemicspinal_cord_injury 
Its informal interpretation is that in case of thoracic aortic injury, if there is loss 
of motor in both legs, and the vertebra is not fractured, then one can conclude 
that the loss of motor is due to an ischemic spinal cord injury. 
Goal-setting rules are used to define and compute attitude. They map evidence 
and conclusions to attitude and take the form: 
Ant! A Ant2 A . . A Ant, D d. 
For example, the following goal-setting rule concludes whether it is relevant to 
know whether a patient has hematuria. 9 
Gunshot-wound-to-abdomen A Bulletinabdomen D Hematuria. 
Its informal interpretation is that in case of a gunshot wound to the abdomen, if 
the bullet remains in the abdominal cavity, then one should also investigate the 
possibility of a hematuria. 
’ Hematuria is a condition in which blood appears in the urine, probably indicating some internal bleeding. 
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A single fact may often be proved, or ruled out, in several alternative ways. Similarly, 
a goal may need to be set in a variety of contexts. The same conclusion can therefore be 
drawn through different evidential rules, and the same goal can be set through different 
goal-setting rules. Conversely, the same proposition p can be the consequent of both 
goal-setting and evidential rules. In particular, a goal-setting rule for p is used to convey 
that it is worth acquiring knowledge about p or that it is worth achieving a state in 
which p holds (depending on p’s semantic interpretation as a diagnostic or repair goal). 
An evidential rule for p is used to conclude whether or not it holds, or put differently 
whether or not it has been satisfied. 
Example 5.3. Consider the diagnosis and repair of a pericardial tamponade, throughout 
which process the following diagnostic and therapeutic goals are instantiated, addressed, 
and satisfied: 
( I ) Rules for setting a diagnostic (knowledge) goal: The need to investigate a 
pericardial tamponade will first be triggered by such observations as muffled 
heart sounds or observable injury to the sternum, and rules of the form: 
(. .) D Pericardial-Tamponade, 
“It is relevant to know if the condition holds”. 
(2) Rules for satisfying a diagnostic (knowledge) goal: This diagnostic goal will 
then be addressed by the planner, recommending an ultrasound effusion or a 
needle aspiration of the pericardial sac, depending on the patient’s state. Such 
test will then be incorporated into the overall plan, considering other concurrent 
needs as well. Whenever taken, results from this test will serve to determine 
whether or not the patient suffers a pericardial tamponade, using rules of the 
form: 
( .) + Pericardial-Tamponade, 
“Conclude whether the condition holds”. 
(3) Rules for setting a therapeutic goal: If the patient is determined to suffer a 
pericardial tamponade then, possibly depending on other conditions s/he may 
suffer, a therapeutic goal of treating the condition may be set, using rules of the 
form: 
(. .) D Relieve_pressurepericardial-sac, 
“It is relevant to address the condition”. 
(4) Rules for satisfying a therapeutic goal: The actual results of the treatment will 
then be used to determine whether or not it was successful, using rules of the 
form: 
(. .) ==+ Relievepressurepericardialsac, 
“Conclude whether the condition has been successfully addressed”. 
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Note again that there is no syntactic distinction between the encoding of rules used 
to set knowledge goals and conclude that they are satisfied, and that of rules used to 
encode the same for state achieving goals. The sole distinction between diagnostic and 
therapeutic goals is a semantic one. A goal’s nature affects what is done when it is set, 
and the conditions under which it can be regarded satisfied. In the ECM architecture, 
both are to be determined by the planner. 
While rules used by GDD to express knowledge have their antecedents expressed 
solely in belief terms, it may often be useful to predicate whether a proposition is a 
goal based on the relevance (or lack thereof) of another goal. To facilitate this within 
a belief-based antecedent calculus, we add a mapping from the attitude bilattice to the 
belief bilattice (denoted attitude-to-belief), roughly modeling the belief in the relevance 
of a given proposition. 
1 
T, a=R, 
attitude-to-belief(a) “zf F, a=I, 
a, otherwise. 
Generally, a natural such mapping is clear when BA and BB are isomorphic. Otherwise, 
one has to make sure that no important relevance information is being lost in the 
transformation. 
5.2. A basic form of inference 
In each cycle of the ECM architecture, a new diagnostic problem is defined by the 
set of rules, and the current known observations. 
Definition 5.4 (Diagnostic problem). A diagnostic problem is a quadruple 
P Ef (H, RB, MO, OBS) 
such that: 
l H = {hl , AZ,. . . , h,} is a set of propositions; 
l RB is a set of evidential and goal-setting rules; 
l MO C H is a set of observations; 
l OBS : MO -+ Bg, is a partial belief function. 
Solving a diagnostic problem (Section 5.4) requires that we compute an inferential 
closure of the observations given the evidential and goal-setting rules. The basic form 
of inference, presented next, is simpler and more intuitive than the one advocated by 
Ginsberg in [ 241. In Section 5.3, we extend it to a form closer to Ginsberg’s in order 
to support reasoning about contradictory information. Let us first define the semantic 
interpretation of rules: 
Definition 5.5 (Belief assignment for an antecedent). Let (+A, +B) be the CUmm 
attitude-belief (defined on the set of propositions H). For any antecedent Ant, the 
inferred belief in that antecedent, 4;; (Ant), is defined as follows: 
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( I ) If Ant is a proposition h, q!$ (Ant) y 4~ (h). 
(2) If Ant is of the form relevant(h), c#$ (Ant) %f attitude-to-belief( 4A (h) ). 
(3) If Ant is of the form rant’, where Ant’ is an antecedent, $$ (Ant) dgf -4: (Ant’). 
(4) If Ant is of the form f(Ant’), where Ant’ is an antecedent, then: 
l If .f is a belief predicate (true,false, unknown, contradictory), then 
q+T, (true(Ani) ) ‘%’ 
L 
i’ ft~~~~~~ =T’ 
4; (@se(Ant’) ) “2’ 
i 
T, &(A&) = F, 
F, otherwise, 
q5; (unknown(Anr’) ) “i’ 
{ 
T. &(A&) = U, 
F, otherwise, 
def 
q$, (contrudictory(Ant’) ) = 
T, 4;(Anr’) = I, 
F, otherwise. 
l Otherwise 
,I 
F, &(A&) =U, 
4; (knowrl( Ant’ ) ) dz’ 1, @(Ant’) = I, 
T, otherwise, 
q5; (unless(Ant’)) z’ -&(Ant’) V +i(known(Ant’)). 
& (computible-with( Ant’ ) ) Ef q$ (Ant’) V -q!$j (known(Ad) ) 
Belief predicates map belief terms to {T, F} and are useful where reasoning in absolute 
terms is necessary. Examples of this are presented in Sections 5.3, and 6.1. Thus, note 
that h and true(h) are interpreted differently and the same is true of +r and false(h). 
Also note that Tknown(h) refers to any situation in which a concrete belief cannot be 
reached whereas unknown(h) describes the particular situation in which h is assigned a 
belief value U, denoting lack of information. In the basic bilattice, I is also categorized 
as lknown( h); in Section 5.3, we will use I to denote unknown due to co-presence of 
contradictory information. 
Definition 5.6 (Belief assignment for a rule’s body). Let (4~) 4~) be our current 
attitude-belief, and let R be a rule with a collection {Anti}:=, of antecedents in its 
body. We will interpret a rule’s body as a simple conjunction by defining: 
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Definition 5.7 (Basic form of consistent inference). An attitude-belief (4~, 4~) is a 
consistent inference for a diagnostic problem P iff 
( 1) it coincides with OBS, i.e. for all h E M&a ( h) = OBS( h) ; 
(2) for any proposition d E H - MO, let {Ri}i=, be the set of evidential rules 
with consequent d, and let #i(R;) denote the evaluation of Ri’s body as in 
Definition 5.6, then these rules are interpreted disjunctively: 
(3) for any proposition d E H, let {Ri}i=, be the set of goal-setting rules with 
consequent d, and let r#$ (Ri) denote their evaluation, then 
Example 5.8. 
( 1) Consider the evidential rule in Definition 5.2. If 
& (Loss-of -motorin~egs) = T, 
$a(Thoracicaorticinjury) = T, and 
$Ja (Compoundfracture-vertebra) = U, 
$$T(Compoundfracture_vertebra) 
= -@a (Compoundfracture-vertebra) = U 
and therefore 
&( Ischemicspinal-cord-injury) = T A T A U = U. 
(2) Consider the goal-setting rule in Definition 5.2. If the rule’s antecedents evaluate 
to T, then 
4; (Hematuria) = attitude-to-belief(T) = R. 
In general, there is no guarantee that a consistent inference is unique or computable, 
or even that it exists. Nevertheless, we will soon present a simple procedure which starts 
with an initial attitude-belief which reflects all observations, and iteratively updates it 
to comply with all rules and observations (Algorithm 1). In our experience, using this 
algorithm, TraumAID 2.0 typically solves a single diagnostic problem in less than a 
second. 
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5.3. Representing and reasoning about contradictory information 
5.3.1. Motivation 
Notice that even though _L is part of both the belief and the attitude bilattices, it 
cannot be assigned to a proposition in the framework developed thus far; this follows 
directly from the fact that propositions are never initialized with I, the fact that truth 
assignments are computed using V and A only, and the fact that i is not in the closure 
of {T,F,U} under A and V. On one hand, this is a good feature of the representation 
and inference scheme. Indeed, Ginsberg notes that I tends to “pollute” an interpretation; 
when I is assigned to one proposition, it will often propagate to many other dependent 
propositions. On the other hand, we will soon argue that i can serve the important role 
of keeping an explicit record of contradictory evidence. We will make a few technical 
suggestions how to overcome the pollution problem. 
Consider two alternative methods used by TraumAID 2.0 to diagnose a tension pneu- 
mothorax (TP) : lo 
(1) X-rayshows_Tension_Pneumothorax(Side=S) 
=+ Tension-Pneumothorax(Side=S) . 
(2) Needle-aspirationshows-pressurein-chest (Side=S) 
+ TensionPneumothorax(Side=S) . 
Note: Both findings, and the diagnosis, can relate to either the right or left of the 
patient. The (Side=S) notation forces same side conclusion, and is implemented using 
unification. 
If one follows a conjirmation strategy, a positive result in one test justifies a diagnosis. 
However, what if one test is negative, and the other has not been taken? By the semantic 
interpretation of the above rules, TP is unknown (computed as F V U). It is not proven, 
but cannot be dismissed since not all means have been exhausted. On the other hand, 
in standard medical practice, a negative test suffices to rule out TP so long as no 
other indication contradicts these test results. Furthermore, it is medically incorrect to 
perform the other test just for complete vindication, Insofar as this other test is not 
performed, providing contradictory evidence, TP should be assumed absent (note the 
non-monotonicity). This reasoning may be encoded in the following augmented GDD 
rules: 
( 1’) X-rayshows_TensionPneumothorax(Side=S) A 
compatible-with(Needle-aspirationshows_ 
pressureinchest (Side=S) > 
3 Tension_Pneumothorax(Side=S). 
(2’) Needleaspirationshowspressuressure_in-chest (Side=S) A 
compatible-with(X-rayshows_TensionPneumothorax(Side=S)) 
+ Tension-Pneumothorax (Side=S) . 
“’ We simplify here. 
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With the addition of a new antecedent, each of these rules will now fail if either test 
is negative. Otherwise, if either or both tests are positive, and there is no contradictory 
evidence, TP is safely concluded positive. 
Now consider the case in which the two tests are performed and provide contradictory 
evidence. Given the first set of rules, TP will be concluded. Given the modified set, both 
rules will fail: one due to the explicit requirement for a positive result, the other due 
to the compatibility requirement. TP will thus be concluded absent. However, although 
it may well be the case that TP is indeed absent, in such instances medical practice 
defaults to treatment as $TP was present. 
So far, a proposition was labeled true or false if it was so asserted or concluded. It 
was labeled unknown if it was not reported and could not be concluded. In other words, 
unknown arose from lack of knowledge. Contradictions belong to a difSerent class of 
unknowns. Commonly arising in practice, while themselves representing an inconsistency 
(either in what one observes or in one’s interpretation of what one observes), it is 
important to represent and cope with contradictions in a consistent manner. Next, in 
order to do so, we first extend rule representation to allow explicit negative conclusions, 
and then generalize the inference accordingly. 
5.3.2. Extended representation 
Reconsidering the original set of rules for TP, two rules can be added in which TP is 
ruled out whenever either of the two tests indicates its absence: 
(3) 1X-rayshows-TensionPneumothorax(Side=S) 
j TTensionPneumothorax(Side=S) . 
(4) YNeedleaspirationshows-pressurein-chest (Side=S) 
j 1TensionPneumothorax(Side=S) . 
TP is now concluded if either test is positive, while +r~ is concluded if either test is 
negative. A conflict arises if we want to interpret TTP as the negation of TP, namely 
when both tests are taken and one succeeds whereas the other fails. In such instance, both 
TP and +r~ will be assigned a truth value T. Ginsberg suggests a more general first-order 
framework under which conflicts can be represented. The extended form of inference 
presented next is a specialization of his approach to the propositional rule-based case. 
5.3.3, Extended inference 
Having extended the representation language, we must now redefine inference to 
allow for rules that explicit falsify a proposition and for the need to combine positive 
and negative contributions. In [ 241, the full first-order formulation of MVL assigns to a 
statement a truth value that combines the results of all possible proofs for that statement 
and its negation. Theoretically, such determination may be undecidable; in practice, it 
may often be intractable, or at least very expensive. In contrast, in the propositional 
rule-based case, proofs need not be searched for since they are given explicitly by the 
corresponding rules. 
In the new definition of consistent inference (Definition 5.9), the body of each rule 
for a given proposition p or its negation yp is first evaluated. The resulting values 
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for p and up are then combined using the + operator. This interpretation is natural 
because one can view each rule as a separate argument for or against p. Combining 
them is thus a synthesis of knowledge sources, and + is the operator that “adds” along 
the bilattice’s knowledge dimension. Since conditions for both p and lp are specified 
explicitly, “negation as failure ” is unnecessary. To avoid negation by failure, each rule’s 
body is padded with U. Thus, a proposition p evaluates to F only if at least one of the 
rules for up succeeds, but not necessarily when all rules for p fail. 
Definition 5.9 (Extended form of consistent inference). An attitude-belief (@A, 4~) is 
a consistent inference for a diagnostic problem instance P iff 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
it coincides with OBS, i.e. for all h f Me, &(h) = OBS(h); 
for any proposition d E H - MO, let {Ri}f=, be the set of evidential rules with 
consequent d, and {??;}f=, the set of evidential rules with consequent Td. Let 
&(R) denote th e evaluation of a rule R body as in Definition 5.6, then 
similarly, for any proposition d E H, let {Ri}f=, be the set of goal-setting rules 
with consequent d, and {R,}i=, the set of goal-setting rules with consequent -d. 
Let 4; (I?) denote a rule’s evaluation, then 
i 
43, (d) = uttitude-to-belief ’ C(4iCRi) V u) + ~b$~CR, AU) 
:=I i-l 
Using the above inference scheme and the four rules for TP, a positive determination 
(T) will be made if either or both tests come up positive. A negative determination 
(F) will be made if one test is negative and the other is either negative or has not been 
taken. Finally, if the two tests contradict each other, then TP will be assigned a I value. 
5.3.4. Dealing with contradictions 
Two major concerns need to be addressed in representing and reasoning about con- 
tradictory information. The first problem concerns the semantic interpretation of a con- 
tradiction. Let p be a proposition for which a contradiction (I) has been inferred. 
(We discuss belief, but similar considerations apply to attitude.) Consider rules whose 
antecedents refer to p. The following two cases should be distinguished: 
(1) 
(2) 
Antecedents of the form f(p), where f is a predicate, will either contribute T, 
if f is the contradictory predicate (cf. Definitions 5.1 and 5.5) or F otherwise. 
Such antecedents do not present a problem since they map -!_ back to the more 
conservative set of values. 
Antecedents of the form p, up, 4mown(p), compatible-with(p), unless(p) or 
unknown(p) yield I when evaluated on I, and thus propagate it. This is the 
“pollution” phenomenon. 
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Prior to assessing the ramifications of pollution, consider the problem of what to 
do when a proposition is assigned _L as a belief. Unfortunately, the answer varies. 
In some cases, a positive (or negative) default is appropriate. In other circumstances, 
none of the conclusions can be safely made and further investigation is warranted. 
When tests have low reliability, for example, a third test may be taken or one of 
the tests may be repeated. In yet other cases, a conclusive decision may be irrelevant 
(e.g. vis-a-vis the GDD principle), or a default to a particular treatment (without 
necessarily making the uncertain conclusion) may be preferred. For example, when 
diagnosing TP, one will default to treating as if TP was positively diagnosed. Note 
however the distinction between defaulting to positive conclusion versus defaulting to 
positive treatment. 
The GDD principle frees us from resolving irrelevant contradictions. Otherwise, the 
contradictory predicate can be used to explicitly specify the desired behavior. For exam- 
ple, the following rule concludes the need to treat as if Tp is positive: 
contradictory(TensionPneumothorax(Side=S)) 
D Rx_Tensionl%eumothorax(Side=S). 
As for the pollution problem, it is insigni$cunt when the polluted proposition has 
no dependents, or when all such dependents are irrelevant. Otherwise, a _L belief must 
simply be tolerated as a type of unknown. If well programmed, pollution of relevant 
propositions in the ECM architecture is by definition a temporary phenomenon whose 
resolution is attempted in subsequent cycles. Finally, the spread of pollution can be 
technically blocked by padding rules with antecedents of the form xontrudictory(p) 
where p is a proposition which may be polluted. 
5.4. Solving diagnostic problems 
While our definition of the diagnostic problem (Definition 5.4) is fairly traditional, 
it is the formal definition of a solution which differentiates the GDD framework from 
other formulations of diagnosis. Let us first define a diagnosis: 
Definition 5.10 (Diagnosis). Let (qb~, 4~) be an inferential closure for a diagnostic 
problem P, then &, its belief part, is a diagnosis for P. 
Indeed, most formalizations of diagnosis take a diagnosis as their solution. In GDD, 
however, we associate more importance with the goals (and consequently the actions) 
adopted during the diagnosis process. We shall therefore define a solution as follows: 
Definition 5.11 (Solution). A solution to a diagnostic problem P is the complete infer- 
ential closure (4~) 4~). 
Consider again Example 5.8, where it is unknown whether or not the patient suffers 
an ischemic spinal cord injury. The diagnosis may thus be considered deficient in 
that regard. However, if according to the goal-setting rules for this particular situation, 
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$A( Ischemicspinal_cordinjury) = I (irrelevant), or even U (unknown), then 
it may not be relevant and the solution is thus satisfactory. This use of relevance is 
reminiscent of its use in AMORD [ 121 to guide a problem solver to more promising 
or important reasoning paths. Here, however, we are less concerned with controlling 
reasoning, but rather in controlling action. 
Goals serve as an intermediary between diagnostic reasoning and action. Thus, in the 
ECM architecture, solving the current diagnostic problem has an operational purpose: it 
defines the goals to be pursued next by the planner and hence the actions that will be 
taken. In the ECM algorithm (Algorithm I), the GDD reasoner is invoked whenever 
new information is acquired. The solution it provides is subsequently used to guide the 
planner in the choice of activity which, in turn, may provide new information to start a 
new cycle. 
Algorithm 1 (Diagnosis and repair in the ECM architecture). 
1. Initialize (4~) 4~) to coincide with OBS: 
4A(h) dzfU forall hEH, 
2. Compute an inferential closure for (4~. da). 
3. Construct a plan P for the combination of goals indicated by that closure. 
4. Until P is empty do 
l Execute P until new evidence arrives. 
l Update (4~) 4~) to reflect this evidence. 
l Go to step 2. 
Note that the termination criterion is not necessarily related to the completeness 
of the working diagnosis. The process terminates when the plan is empty, i.e. when 
all goals have been addressed, or when no means are available for addressing re- 
maining goals. On the other hand, while goals are the “architectural duty” of the 
GDD reasoner, the belief part of the solution (characterization) is still important serv- 
ing two purposes: first, to human users, it is useful for the system to be able to 
explain its decisions. Second, beliefs can be useful for planning separate from the 
goals they give rise to, as they might affect choice of means and/or ordering deci- 
sions. 
6. A design methodology for GDD-based systems 
We have so far discussed the formalism and function, but not the use, of GDD. In 
this section, we propose a design methodology for GDD-based systems. Specifically, 
in accordance with the ECM architecture’s decomposition of the reasoning task, we 
propose that: 
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( 1) local patterns of behavior (or strategies) be explicitly encoded 
(a) in GDD rules, using goals as milestones and choice points, and using goal- 
setting and evidential rules to represent progress within a local strategy; 
(b) in the planner, via pre-defined local procedures (sequences of actions that 
can be used to locally satisfy a given goal), and via mappings from goals to 
a set of alternative procedures, ordered by their respective local preference 
for the given goal (i.e. independently of other needs) ; 
(2) constraints and preferences on combinations of goals, procedures, and actions, 
be specified as much as possible in the form of general principles; given a 
combination of goals, these principles be used by the planner to implicitly merge 
a corresponding combination of local strategies. 
TraumAID 2.0’s planner, using a selection-and-ordering plan sketching algorithm 
[ 501, is one planner that satisfies the above requirements. Next, we first introduce goal 
inhibition-a macro-mechanism useful in encoding local strategies and some of the 
interaction of these strategies. We then discuss and present an example of the encoding 
of local strategies. Finally, we discuss and illustrate some of the principles and means 
for combining local strategies for multiple concurrent goals. 
6.1. Goal inhibition 
We intend to use GDD rules to encode strategies-ways in which an agent is to 
respond to various situations in which s/he may find themselves. Usually, strategies are 
designed constructively. However, the on-going interplay between diagnosis and therapy 
in trauma management may sometimes require that pursuit of certain goals be delayed, 
or even inhibited. While goal interaction is naturally addressed by a planner, planning is 
notoriously complex and so it may be advantageous if unnecessary or non-contributing 
goals can be inhibited before they are passed on to the planner. This is the purpose of 
goal inhibition rules. 
The basic approach to goal inhibition is to qualify goal-setting rules by the negation 
of applicable inhibition conditions. Consider for example a patient with a right lumbar 
wound. Normally, such injury would suggest a possible duodenal injury: 
Rightlumbarsound D Duodenalinjury. 
A standard test for duodenal injury is a CT scan. However, this lengthy and costly 
procedure should not be pursued once a need for a laparotomy has been established 
since the surgical procedure will expose the duodenum anyway. Thus, we can qualify 
the above rule as follows: 
Right-lumbar-wound A unless(Laparotomyrequired) 
D Duodenalinjury. 
While correct, the problem with such inhibition scheme is that if the inhibition 
condition is complex, rules become even more complex and hard to maintain. In addition, 
overloading rules make them less interpretable since the distinct function of each of a 
rule’s antecedents becomes unclear (cf. [ 21) . Instead, inhibiting relationships between 
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goals and between goals and conclusions can be specified separately, and then compiled 
into each goal’s rules. 
Definition 6.1 (Goal inhibition clause). Given a goal g, inhibit(g) specifies the condi- 
tion( s) under which g has to be inhibited. 
In the above example, one can then write a rule: 
Laparotomyrequired =+ inhibit (Duodenal-injury) 
One way to compile inhibition information into the rules is to pad every goal-setting 
rule for a goal g as follows. Let body(R) be the original body of a goal-setting rule R, 
replace body(R) with 
body’{ R) cf body( R) A -true( inhibit( g) ) 
A more elegant alternative approach to goal inhibition is based on the extension of 
GDD proposed in Section 5.3. In the extended framework, a goal-setting rule with a 
negative consequent can be thought of as representing an argument against pursuing that 
goal which is exactly what we mean by inhibition. Taking that view, a goal inhibition 
rule is considered together with all reasons for its pursuit. Under this approach, goal 
inhibition rules are constructed as follows. Let g be a goal, and let inhibit(g) be an 
inhibition clause for g. Add a goal inhibition rule: 
inhibit(g) D Tg. 
In our previous example, we will write: 
Laparotomyrequired D TDuodenalinjury. 
Under the inference procedure of Section 5.3, a contradictory attitude (1) will be 
assigned to a goal for which both a goal-setting and a goal inhibition rule have succeeded. 
A third approach to effectively inhibit goals which is sometimes preferable in imple- 
menting diagnostic strategies is to “force” a concrete value (i.e. T or F) on the goal’s 
underlying proposition. The net effect of this approach is that the goal remains relevant, 
but is regarded achieved by the planner and thus not actively pursued. This approach is 
likely to be preferable when a belief in the inhibited goal’s status can be inferred from 
the inhibiting condition (cf. Example 6.2) ; otherwise, this approach may be inelegant. 
6.2. Local strategies 
In programming artificial agents, we try to provide them with a strategy-the capabil- 
ity to respond appropriately to each of the situations in which they may find themselves. 
A strategy can be represented explicitly, e.g. enumerating states and responses; implic- 
itly, e.g. as a procedure to compute a response from a state’s representation; or as a 
combination of explicit and implicit representations. In generat, different representa- 
tions of strategies follow from different tradeoffs between the time and space needed to 
construct, represent, and use a given strategy. 
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In many domains, trauma management included, an agent’s task can be broken down 
into a combination of several subtasks, each of which is not very complex. The complex- 
ity of the overall strategy in such domains is thus the result of the potential interactions 
between substrategies. We propose that in such domains it may be useful to explicitly 
specify each of the substrategies, while using more implicit reasoning to compute con- 
textually appropriate responses to combinations thereof. This approach is particularly 
useful in domains in which a large number of substrategies are potentially applicable 
but only a few, albeit possibly different ones each time, are likely to be concurrently 
pursued. We call each of these substrategies a local strategy. 
In the trauma management domain, strategies can be localized around individual prob- 
lems, e.g. the diagnosis and repair of a tension pneumothorax. Local strategies can also 
be organized around a certain resource or expertise, e.g. planning a series of X-rays 
versus planning an operation, or describing work done by a physician versus that done 
by a nurse. Localization is often domain specific, and one may therefore have to rely 
on an expert’s intimate knowledge of the domain. The use of localized strategies is a 
simple matter of divide-and-conquer and so it can also accommodate automatically gen- 
erated subplans (as in [ 18,32,.56] ), as well as combinations of automatically generated 
subplans and explicitly specified substrategies. 
An important distinction of our local strategies is that while inference-responses are 
explicitly specified in GDD rules, action-responses are not. Instead, local strategy’s GDD 
rules are used to specify goal-responses. A set of alternative procedures/actions that can 
be used with the intention of satisfying these goals (and thereby bringing about the 
local strategy’s next state, or conclusion) is specified for the planner. 
From a design perspective, there are two advantages here. First, it is not required that 
action-responses, eventually computed from goal-responses, necessarily achieve a pre- 
determined effect. One can assess any outcome. Second, goals serve as choice points in a 
local strategy. The fact that a goal can sometimes be addressed with multiple alternative 
courses of action adds to the planner’s ability to take advantage of synergy in merging 
several local strategies. In addition, goal inhibition may sometimes help in relieving 
some of the computational complexity of planning. 
Example 6.2 (Diagnosis and repair of a tension pneumothorax). Recall that JR was 
suspected to have suffered a tension pneumothorax (TP). Diagnosis of TP follows a 
general strategy which we call scaled diagnosis where diagnostic activity proceeds cau- 
tiously by first acquiring information of lower cost. Consider the rules in Fig. 5, present- 
ing a simplified version of TraumAID 2.0’s strategy. l1 Diagnosis starts with a report of 
a chest wound. Rule 400 initiates the first diagnostic goal, Possibility-of -Tension_ 
Pneumothorax (PTP), by labeling its attitude R. When this goal is referred to the plan- 
ner, it will ask whether the patient is in shock and/or whether the patient suffers from 
distended neck veins. If positive, any of these findings will confirm a PTP, instantiating 
the next diagnostic goal: Likely-Tension-Pneumothorax (LTP). Note that if it was 
immediately volunteered that the patient was in shock, then reasoning could immedi- 
” Rule numbers reflect the order in which they were designed and serve no purpose other than referential. 
Implication is denoted using [> in goal-setting rules, and => in evidential rules. 
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; A chest wound initiates the process by setting first knowledge 
; goal 
400 Chest-Wound (Side=S) 
[> Possibility_of_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
; Initial physical evidence is gathered and used to continue or rule 
; out 
401 Chest-Wound (Side=S) 
Shock 
=> Possibility_of_Tension_Pneumothorax 
402 Chest-Wound (Side=S) 
Distended-Neck-Veins 
=> Possibility_of_Tension_Pneumothorax 
(Side=S) 
(Side=S) 
; In the case of positive evidence, the diagnostic process gears up 
500 Possibility_Of_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
[> Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
; . . .and more examination takes place 
501 Possibility_Df_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
Decreased_Breath_Sounds (Side=S) 
=> Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
; enough clinical evidence to justify testing 
600 Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
[> Tension-Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
Fig. 5. Diagnosis of tension pneumothorax from the initiating wound to the point where there is enough 
clinical evidence to justify extensive testing. 
ately “leap” to that latter stage. If that was the case, then PTP’s attitude would still have 
been labeled R, but it would not have been pursued since it would have already been 
believed to hold. To pursue LTP, the planner will ask to assess patient’s breath sounds. 
The final diagnostic goal, labeled accordingly Tension-Pneumothorax (TP), will then 
be instantiated if LTP is confirmed. 
Fig. 6 presents the final diagnostic stage, which we have already discussed in Sec- 
tion 5.3. Recall also that the therapeutic goal Rx-TensionPneumothorax (RTP) was 
recommended both when TP was confirmed, and also when there was contradictory 
evidence with respect to its presence. 
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; Alternatives: TP can be diagnosed via either X-ray or needle. 
601 Tension_Pneumothorax_On_X-Ray (Side=S) 
=> Tension-Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
602 Needle_Aspiration_Chest_For_Pressure (Side=9 
=> Tension-Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
603 not Tension_Pneumothorax_On_X-Ray (Side=S) 
=> not Tension-Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
604 not Needle_Aspiration_Chest_For_Pressure (Side=S) 
=> not Tension-Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
; Recommendation part. If unsure, treat "as if" positive. 
700 Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
[> Rx_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
701 conflicted Tension-Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
[> Rx_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
Fig. 6. Diagnosis of tension pneumothorax: alternative diagnostic tests, and therapeutic recommendation. 
Fig. 7 describes the therapeutic part of that strategy (or more precisely the part 
that recommends therapeutic goals, and evaluates whether or not these goals have been 
satisfied by previous actions). Notice that therapeutic goals are only labeled satisfied 
when there is actual evidence to that effect. Also note that there are two therapeutic 
goals, depending on whether the patient is stable or not. Finally notice the interaction 
of the therapeutic substrategy with the diagnostic substrategy in cases where a needle 
is used in the latter: a patient that was diagnosed through a needle aspiration does not 
need further decompression. 
In this case, we have encoded goal inhibition knowledge by allowing lower-level goals 
to be subsumed by their successors whenever the latter are concluded directly (Fig. 8). 
As noted, other strategies may use different schemes. 
6.3. Implicitly combining local strategies 
The way in which local strategies are combined in the ECM architecture is implicit 
in two ways. First, the combined strategy is never represented explicitly. Rather, it is 
constructed on the fly, as it is executed. Second, for the most part, what is encoded 
are combination principles, as opposed to a recipe as to how to merge any particular 
combination of strategies. 
Strategies can be combined on two levels: 
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702 Chest-Tube (Side=S) 
unless Persistent_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
=> Rx_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
; If in shock, relieve it before proceeding with definitive treat- 
; ment. 
800 relevant Rx_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
Shock 
[> Decompressed_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
; if a needle was used for diagnosis then already decompressed. 
801 Needle_Aspiration_Chest_For_Pressure (Side=S) 
=> Decompressed_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
; that’s not a good way to do it, but will achieve the goal. 
802 Chest-Tube (Side=S) 
=> Decompressed_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
Fig. 7. Treatment of tension pneumothorax under various physical and knowledge conditions. 
10400 Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
=> Possibility_Of_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
10401 relevant Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
=> Possibility_Of_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
10500 Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
=> Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
10501 relevant Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
=> Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side=S) 
(1) 
(2) 
Fig. 8. Tension pneumothorax: a hierarchy of goals. 
On the goal level, one can specify when a certain goal suppresses, inhibits, or is 
prioritized with respect to another, and when a certain combination of goals can 
be replaced with a generalizing goal or set of goals. 
On the procedurelaction level, one can specify a preference for one procedure 
over another with respect to a certain goal; a preference for a certain combina- 
tion of procedures for a certain combination of goals (e.g., a “cost” minimization 
criterion); and compatibility and ordering constraints between two or more pro- 
cedures or actions. 
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Again, the interested reader is referred to [48,50] for details about the ECM plan- 
ner. 
63.1. Combining in the goal level 
Many times, local strategies can be combined at the goal level, without having to 
reason about possible choices of action for these goals. Of particular interest are negative 
relationships between goals that would result in a reduction in the number of goals that 
need subsequently be considered by the planner. Consider for example, the following 
relationships: 
l Suppression: The emergence of one goal subsumes another. This can be because 
one goal is a specialization of another, e.g. the need for an abdominal operation 
for unknown reasons versus the need for an abdominal operation to repair the 
duodenum; it can be because a certain treatment subsumes another, or renders it 
inappropriate, e.g. an ER thoracotomy will subsume any other diagnosis and/or 
treatment; with diagnostic goals, it can be because any information that can be 
acquired by any action aimed at one goal would also satisfy the other goal, e.g. an 
exploratory laparotomy will subsume some abdominal investigations. 
l Inhibition or prioritization: The current pursuit of one goal inhibits or delays the 
pursuit of another, e.g. pursuit of abdominal bleeding as a possible cause of shock 
is inhibited in some patients if a possibility of tension pneumothorax has not yet 
been pursued. Note that the only difference between inhibition and suppression 
is that an inhibited goal may be resumed after the inhibiting goal is satisfied. A 
special case is prioritization, when one goal should be pursued before another, e.g. 
treating a pneumothorax should often be pursued prior to treating an esophageal 
injury. 
Such relationships are encoded in the ECM architecture using goal inhibition clauses 
which are then expanded into GDD rules, e.g. 
l the desire to suppress g2 in the presence of gr is expressed as: 
inhibit(g2) = relevant( gl ) , 
l the desire that gt inhibits gz, until or unless gl is determined negative is expressed 
as: 
inhibit( g2) = relevant(gl ) A +alse( gl ) , 
l the desire to prioritize the pursuit of gl over that of g2 is expressed as: 
inhibit(g2) = relevant(gl) A +nown(gl). 
Additional prioritization information is encoded in goals’ features, which are used to 
determine their respective ordering by the planner. For example, since a pneumothorax’s 
priority is airway (cf. JR’s case, Section l), its diagnosis and treatment will usually 
precede that of an esophageal injury whose priority is contamination. In TraumAID 2.0’s 
planning algorithm, such priorities translate into (a) preferred choice, in that procedures 
are first chosen for higher-ranking goals, and (b) precedence, in that actions aimed at 
goals of higher priority/urgency are often scheduled ahead of others. 
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63.2. Combining in the procedure/action level 
In TraumAID 2.0’s planner, procedures and actions for concurrently pursued local 
strategies are merged in a selection-and-ordering algorithm using the following combi- 
nation principles: 
( 1) Preference for addressing one goal versus another as indicated by their relative 
urgency and priority. 
(2) Preference among alternative procedures for a given goal (assuming this goal is 
present alone). 
(3) Some restricted forms of preference among combinations of procedures for com- 
binations of goals are specified via a cost measure that is used by the planner’s 
parsimonious set-covering model. More complicated forms may require explicit 
specification either in GDD rules which manipulate goals, or in optimization 
transformations which are later applied to the plan. 
(4) Constraints and preferences on co-presence and ordering of several procedures 
within a plan can be specified for the planner’s scheduling algorithm, e.g., based 
on the respective urgency and priority of the corresponding goals and based on 
the site in which a procedure is selected to be performed. 
6.4. A combination of local strategies in JR’s case 
JR’s management presents an interplay between several local strategies, e.g., diagnosis 
and treatment of a tension pneumothorax (cf. Example 6.2), diagnosis and treatment of 
a pericardial tamponade (cf. Example 5.3)) general abdominal examination, treatment 
of a hemothorax, and others. 
First notice that the different strategies are triggered at different times during manage- 
ment and that each proceeds in a different pace. Also note that the combined strategy 
is not represented per se, but is rather implicitly and incrementally constructed via an 
on-going mediation between the local strategies. 
Most of the explicit and implicit encoding mechanisms are represented in this single 
case, in particular: 
( 1) The goal of inserting a chest tube for the right hemothorax is suppressed by the 
goal of operating on the chest. 
(2) The goals of investigating the pericardial sac and abdomen for causes of shock 
are inhibited/prioritized until after the investigation of a tension pneumothorax 
as an alternative explanation is completed. 
(3) Their respective features indicate that the goal of diagnosing a tension pneu- 
mothorax is more urgent and has a higher priority (airway versus circulation) 
than the goal of investigating the abdomen. 
(4) The goal of diagnosing a pericardial tamponade can either be addressed with an 
ultrasound, or via a needle aspiration. This is the local order of preference. In 
JR’s case, a needle aspiration is preferred due to the urgent nature of the injury. 
(5 ) Preference for a parsimonious combination of procedures for the combination of 
goals is exemplified by the choice of a bilateral thoracotomy as a single operation 
that can be used to gain access to both the heart and the left chest. 
R. RymodArtijicial Intelligence 84 (1996) 257-297 289 
(6) Finally, the use of constraints in the on-line merging of local strategies is exem- 
plified by the following: 
l Constraints based on goal features are exemplified by ordering the aspiration 
of the chest prior to the aspiration of the pericardial sac. Another example, as 
per (3)) is its ordering it prior to the abdominal X-ray studies. 
l Constraints based on logistic considerations are exemplified by scheduling 
the abdominal X-ray prior to the thoracic arteriogram. The arteriogram is 
later discarded, but at first it is scheduled later because it requires access to 
machinery that is only available in the X-ray room, whereas an abdominal 
X-ray can be done in the ER. 
l As mentioned, an example of constraints based on time/urgency is the selection 
of an otherwise fess-preferable n edle aspiration as a means of diagnosing a 
pericardial tamponade. The ultrasound, which is usually preferable, conflicts 
with the urgency of this and other goals. 
l Constraints that result in incompatibility (in this case a conflict between logis- 
tical and time constraints) are exemplified in that the arteriogram, as well as 
the investigation of a potential esophageal injury, are not pursued at all once 
JR is transferred to the operating room. 
7. General strategies for mixed diagnosis and repair 
We have developed a framework which integrates diagnostic reasoning and plan- 
ning in an architecture for reasoning in exploratory-corrective domains. To support our 
claims regarding the suitability of our approach, we tried to identify important strategies 
from diagnosis and repair domains, in order to show that they can be encoded in this 
framework, and that indeed such encoding is natural. From an engineering perspective, 
identifying abstract forms of such strategies facilitates the creation of strategy templates 
for future use. From a scientific perspective, this study has retrospectively resulted in an 
intriguing collection of diagnosis and repair strategies which will have to be dealt with 
by developers of other competing frameworks. 
Scientists have studied diagnostic and therapeutic strategies for a variety of reasons. 
Many have studied medical decision making with the purpose of educating physicians 
[ 15,16,26,27,38]. Others have studied such strategies with the objective of eventu- 
ally teaching them to a machine, or of acquiring insights on how to encode medical 
knowledge in computerized decision support systems, e.g. [ 1,3,4,34,53]. 
The notion of strategy is clearly useful, and is sometimes explicitly present in medical 
management programs, e.g. the skeletal plans of ONCOCIN [ 25,311 and ATTENDING 
1361. However, we found that diagnostic strategies are much better studied and doc- 
umented than ones in which diagnosis and therapy are mixed. In [48], we show how 
the GDD/ECM framework can be used to encode what seems to be an agreed upon 
collection of primitive building blocks for diagnostic strategies, namely hypothesis gen- 
eration, specialization, generalization, confirmation, and elimination. Here, we focus on 
strategies that represent important diagnosis and repair “philosophies”. Although most 
of these strategies were originally identified in the trauma domain, we believe that 
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the principles demonstrated in them are of general importance to decision making in 
exploratory-corrective domains, and maybe other domains as well. 
7.1. The “do no harm” principle 
A basic principle of medical diagnosis is avoiding the use of a diagnostic method 
whose consequences may be harsher than the diagnosed condition itself. For example, 
while a laparotomy can be used to diagnose renal injury, it would not be the method 
of choice for that purpose alone; rather a CT scan or an IVP would typically be used. 
However, if a laparotomy is prescribed for other reasons then it is preferred not to spend 
extra time and effort on a CT scan. 
Encoding this example in GDD, three rules can be used to infer renal injury from 
each of the three alternative sources of information: CT scan, IVP, and the surgical 
procedure. Choosing the means for addressing a renal injury suspicion, one must make 
sure that a surgical procedure is not chosen unless it is necessary anyway. One way to 
do so is to let the planner figure the most efficient method given the co-present injuries 
and associated goals. Alternatively, the diagnostic goal can simply be inhibited whenever 
a laparotomy is needed. 
The “do no harm” principle extends to cases where the diagnostic method is harsher 
than the treatment of the diagnosed condition. For example, while herpes encephalitis 
can be diagnosed via a brain biopsy, it is less risky to prescribe a drug for its treatment 
and then observe the patient to see if it works (a form of empirical therapy) _ I2 
7.2. Buying time 
If a definitive treatment requires an elaborate procedure that cannot be done immedi- 
ately, there may sometimes be another procedure which although less effective, is quick 
and can provide temporary relief. Buying time is particularly useful in patients suffering 
from multiple injuries, where it can allow diagnosis and treatment of other injuries. In 
an unstable patient suffering a tension pneumothorax, for example, temporary relief can 
be provided via decompressing the pressure. A more definitive chest tube procedure, and 
if necessary an operation, can then follow. In TraumAID, such a strategy is encoded by 
separating two goal-setting rules: one for the urgent treatment and the other for the more 
definitive one. The definitive goal will only be instantiated after the urgent treatment has 
been accomplished. 
In a slight twist, one may want to “buy time” for more accurate diagnosis. In a space 
station domain, for example, it may be easy to identify that air is leaking but hard to 
find the precise cause of leakage. In the meantime, air can be temporarily added to 
maintain habitability and allow for further investigation. l3 
I2 This example was communicated to us by Chris Cimino 
‘I This example was communicated to us by Ethan Scarl. 
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7.3. All roads lead to Rome 
Sometimes, it may not be known which of two or more diseases is present. However, 
if both share the same treatment, then further differentiation will have no effect on the 
choice of action and by the GDD principle should thus be avoided. In case of abdominal 
injury, for example, it may sometimes be hard to determine which internal organs were 
injured. However, since they all require a laparotomy, the diagnostic process is ceased 
whenever one organ is determined to be injured. Furthermore, a laparotomy will also be 
called for if there is enough non-specific evidence for intra abdominal injury. In GDD, 
that strategy is encoded via goal inhibition rules. 
7.4. Cover all bases 
Related to the “all roads lead to Rome”, is the strategy of treating all remaining 
hypotheses. Once left with a small set of such hypotheses, it may well pay to treat 
as if they were all present, rather than to refine the diagnosis. This strategy was used 
by MYCIN [ 511, where a set of antibiotics was chosen to cover all diagnoses above a 
certain threshold. 
7.5. Gambling 
It may not always be possible to carry out a diagnostic process to its end, or it may 
be too risky to do so. A decision may then have to be made considering a number 
of competing hypotheses that have not yet been confirmed, nor eliminated. Utility 
theory tells us that for such a decision to be optimal, it should maximize the expected 
utility as measured by preferences over possible outcomes. Indeed, utilities have been 
used extensively in medical decision making (see [ 28,391 for an excellent review). 
Following are a few strategies in which probabilistic and utility-based considerations 
seem to be involved: 
l Gamble on best scenario: Consider a patient presenting unconscious from shock 
with a suspected pericardial tamponade and/or lacerated abdominal aorta. In the 
presence of an adverse condition such as a distended abdomen, it may be too 
dangerous to try and differentiate the two hypotheses; a definitive action is required. 
As it turns, regardless of which condition is more believable, the correct strategy 
is to treat the patient as if s/he has a pericardial tamponade. Table 1, listing the 
likely outcomes, justifies this choice; pericardial tamponade is the only survivable 
injury. 
Table 1 
Administering treatment for Patient has 
pericardial tamponade lacerated aorta 
pericardial tamponade 
lacerated aorta 
lives 
dies 
dies 
dies 
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In GDD, this strategy can be encoded by setting the goal of treating a pericardial 
tamponade and letting this goal override both diagnostic goals. That way, we do 
not conclude the presence of a pericardial tamponade, but rather the need to treat 
as if it was present. 
l Picking order of attention: Consider an unstable patient with a stab wound to the 
lower chest. The cause of shock, which could be one of tension pneumothorax (due 
to collapse of the lungs), pericardial tamponade (due to bleeding in the pericardial 
sac), or abdominal shock (due to internal bleeding in the abdomen), must be 
urgently removed. 
With insufficient information, since each of the different alternative causes re- 
quires a different treatment and since these treatments cannot be pursued concur- 
rently, we must sequentially try one treatment at a time until the shock is relieved. 
Of course, the order in which the various hypotheses are tried is important. In 
practice, the order in which treatments are tried depends on accompanying signs, 
and on the expected outcome of the decision, roughly following an informal utility- 
theoretic decision process. 
Note that while the goals instantiated in this process are typically diagnostic, 
the procedures that are recommended are therapeutic in nature, with the diagnostic 
side-effect of confirming or rejecting the hypothesis, depending on their outcome. 
For example, a needle aspiration of the chest will be ordered for the diagnosis of a 
tension pneumothorax, thereby also providing an indication as to whether (a) the 
condition was present, and (b) was the sole source of shock. Thus, this procedure 
mixes diagnosis and therapy in a reverse order: a condition is diagnosed after, and 
as a result of its treatment. 
Gambling strategies are considerably affected by the utilities attached to various 
outcomes. Naturally, such utilities are patient specific, and thus, the appropriate strategy 
may differ from one patient to another. The treatment of spinal cord trauma with steroids, 
for example, may improve the chances of the patient walking again, but may also cause 
complications, and even death, in certain patients. In trauma management, using patient- 
specific utilities is complicated by the fact that patients can often not be asked for their 
preference. 
7.6. Treating causal chains 
Chain effects are common in physical systems. For example, a gunshot wound to 
the back may result in an injury to the aorta. Then, blood accumulating in the chest 
cavity (hemothorax) may result in shock. On such occasions, one has to decide which 
to address first: the problem (e.g. the hemothorax), or its cause(s) (e.g. the injured 
aorta). More generally, given a causal chain, one has to decide which problems on the 
chain to address first. Unfortunately, there is no single recipe. Such a decision is affected 
by a number of factors. For example: 
( 1) The duration and persistence of the problem and cause. In particular, whether the 
cause was a single event in the past, or is still present and continuing to cause 
the problem. Similarly, the need to address the problem depends on whether it 
will continue to be present, and its severity, once its cause is removed. 
R. Rymon/Art$cial Intelligence 84 (1996) 257-297 293 
(2) The window of opportunity for fixing the problem. If there is urgency in ad- 
dressing the problem, then it may be preferable to address it first, even if it is 
impossible to address it completely before its cause can be permanently fixed, 
and even if this may require significantly more work. 
(3) Lack of knowledge about the cause. 
(4) Amenability of the cause to treatment, the risk associated with such treatment, 
or potential drastic side-effects of such treatment. 
Given such considerations, the following (and hybrids) are some possible strategies: 
( 1) address the cause only, letting the problem take care of itself as a result of such 
treatment; 
(2) address the cause first; then take care of the problem; 
(3) iterate through staged therapy for both cause and problem; 
(4) address only the problem, ignoring or probing the cause; 
(5) address the problem; then the cause (possibly while maintaining treatment for 
the problem) ; 
(6) relieve the problem; then address the cause; then provide definitive treatment to 
the problem. 
In GDD, we can use goal inhibition rules to express order preference on therapeutic 
goals. Each of the above strategies can be encoded in GDD using such rules. In related 
work, Long et al. [35] suggest a framework in which, to devise treatment, explicitly 
represented causal chains are traversed until a treatable cause is encountered; this latter 
cause is then treated. 
7.7. Causing new problems 
Treatment, e.g. a drug, for a given problem may itself cause another problem, which 
should then be addressed. In other circumstances, the new problem is created to facilitate 
the treatment to the existing problem, e.g. lowering the blood potassium level to stop 
the heart during an open heart operation. Even more common in practice is risking new 
problems, as a result of treatment prescribed to other problems. 
In GDD, the prescription of problem-causing treatment should trigger (via goal-setting 
rules) the therapeutic goals associated with the new problem. Where there is risk of 
such new problems, one should instantiate diagnostic goals for proper monitoring. 
8. Summary of contributions 
Our work on TraumAID 2.0 has resulted in three different contributions: 
( 1) The first contribution is a reasoning architecture for exploratory-corrective sys- 
tems, which integrates diagnostic reasoning and planning components. Most of 
this paper focuses on the diagnostic reasoning part of this architecture, which 
follows the goal-directed diagnosis (GDD) paradigm. GDD begins from the 
principle that diagnosis is only worthwhile to the extent that it has the potential 
to afleet subsequent repair decisions, and similarly that repair is only worthwhile 
to the extent that it can positively affect the eventual outcome. The key in the 
GDD formalization (Sections 4 and 5) is that explicit representation and rea- 
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soning about goals can facilitate focusing on worthy activity. Goals also serve 
as a natural interface with the companion planner, which is described elsewhere 
[ 48,501. We have also presented a design methodology for GDD-based systems 
(Section 6) in which explicitly encoded local strategies are implicitly merged by 
a mediating planner. 
The second contribution is a catalog of abstract diagnosis and repair strategies 
(Section 7). Most of these strategies were identified in the trauma domain, 
but can be found in other exploratory-corrective domains as well. Although 
loosely defined and incomplete, we found this collection intriguing, and believe 
it should be of interest to other workers in medical decision making, and artificial 
intelligence in general. In particular, alternative methodologies for design and 
construction of exploratory-corrective systems will benefit from being capable of 
representing these strategies. 
The third contribution is of course the TraumAID system itself. In this paper, 
we limited the exposition of TraumAID 2.0 to the minimum required to mo- 
tivate and demonstrate the features of the presented framework. The interested 
reader is referred to [48] for more details about the system. A study compar- 
ing management plans produced by TraumAID 2.0 with actual care in a trauma 
center is described in [ 7,481. Three trauma surgeons, serving as judges, found 
TraumAID 2.0’s plans preferable to the actual care by a ratio of 64 to 17. A 
prospective study, on a larger scale, is planned with the system actually fielded 
at the Emergency Center of the Medical College of Pennsylvania. I _I 
Current work on the TraumAID project I4 addresses some of the weaknesses in the 
current system, and extends it to facilitate its deployment during actual trauma care: 
l Symbolic geometric knowledge may not provide the best means for reasoning 
about alternative penetration paths for gunshot and stab wounds. As part of the 
TRAuMAP project [29], Jonathan Kaye and Lola Ogunyemi are working on a 
geometric reasoning module. The user is asked to place external wounds and inter- 
nal projectiles on a 3D body, and the system then determines potential anatomical 
organ involvement. The user can reposition the view arbitrarily, or “fly through” a 
hypothesis to get a better perspective on what might have been affected. Clinical 
data (including X-rays) can then be used to discriminate among compelling hy- 
potheses. More generally, TRAuMAP seeks to illustrate the relationship between 
anatomical and physiological findings. Specifically, physiological changes (e.g., 
pressures) may affect anatomical parts and anatomical changes may affect values 
for physiological parameters [ 301. TRAuMAP associates material properties with 
3D anatomical models and links them with physiological simulations that then can 
allow user interaction. 
l Rules are also not the best way to determine and predict various states of shock. A 
cardiovascular model of acute hemorrhage is being developed by Stefanie Neumann 
to support such determination [ 37,441. It projects in real time the future possi- 
ble physiologic conditions of patients experiencing massive blood loss, and their 
response to subsequent therapy. Driven by a time-varying ventricular compliance, 
I4 See [ 9 1 for a recent overview. 
R. Rymon/Artijcial Intelligence 84 (1996) 257-297 295 
the beat-to-beat model depicts the evolution over time of physiologic parameters 
monitored in the ER and ICU. 
l While our validation studies have shown that TraumAID 2.0 is able to produce 
management plans of acceptable quality, there remains the issue of how to com- 
municate information about those plans to physicians engaged in patient care in 
such a way as to actually affect their behavior and, potentially, the outcome of 
cases. Physicians exposed to an earlier version of TraumAID complained that the 
plans produced by the system were often very similar, if not identical, to what they 
were planning to do anyway. For this system to be of use to them they would have 
to look through a great deal of information they did not need, to find the items 
that could help them. In response to this problem, Abigail Gertner has developed 
TraumaTIQ, a critiquing interface to the TraumAID system [22,23]. The design 
of TraumaTIQ is based on the philosophy that physicians (or anyone) engaged in 
time-critical activities that require a great deal of attention should only be inter- 
rupted by a decision support system if it appears that they are about to commit 
an error. This both reduces the amount of the physician’s attention required by the 
system, and ensures that the information produced is relevant to his or her intended 
plan. During a case, TraumaTIQ monitors the procedures ordered by the physi- 
cian to be carried out. Through a process of plan recognition and plan evaluation, 
TraumaTIQ identifies potentially significant errors of omission and commission, as 
well as inefficiencies in the physician’s plan. Critiques regarding these errors are 
expressed as English sentences. 
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